Cal Football Advanced Stats Evans Hall Review: Money Downs

The top sheet data for 3rd and 4th downs for Cal in 2015:

(The data for this article comes from http://www.cfbstats.com/, this place offers great data on the finer details in college football).

	Cal	Opponents
3rd Down Conversions: Conversion %	46.93%	43.01%
3rd Down Conversions: Attempts - Conversions	179 - 84	193 - 83
4th Down Conversions: Conversion %	50%	58.82%
4th Down Conversions: Attempts - Conversions	26 - 13	17 - 10

In vacuum these numbers don't mean a lot, however, once we look into the Pac-12 overall states we can see that Cal has been very good at converting 3rd downs in the grand scheme of things:

3rd Down

Offense

		Games	Attempts	Conversions	Conversion %
1	Stanford	14	182	91	50
2	California	13	179	84	46.93
3	UCLA	13	195	88	45.13
4	Arizona State	13	229	94	41.05
5	Utah	13	200	82	41
6	Arizona	13	189	77	40.74
7	Washington State	13	190	77	40.53
8	USC	14	189	74	39.15
9	Oregon	13	179	70	39.11
10	Washington	13	169	64	37.87
11	Colorado	13	208	75	36.06
12	Oregon State	12	164	52	31.71

Cal has been very good at not getting itself into 3rd down situations, when we take into consideration the low rate of turn-overs by Cal's offense (sans the Utah game), Cal's offense was tied for 10th in the number of 3rd down attempts in the Pac-12. Most importantly, Cal's 3rd down conversion rate ranked 2nd in the Pac-12 (second only to Stanfurd). Which is surprising due to the awful "power-run" rating Cal offense had over the course of the season (108th in the FBS). Of course anyone who paid attention to Cal football in 2015 (including the scouts for the L.A. Rams) knows that it was the interplay between #1 overall pick QB Jared Goff and his receivers (all of whom that were eligible were drafted or signed as UDFAs by NFL teams).

Here we can see the 3rd down conversion rate by the offense throughout the season. Besides the 2-9 ratio at SDSU, all wins correlated with 3rd down conversion rates of at least 50%. The only loss with >50% conversion rate being at the hands of Stanfurd. There are many reasons for this loss: poor red-zone performance that lead Cal to trade FGs for TDs, and the fact that Stanfurd was the #1 3rd down offense in the conference.

Passing on 3rd Down

We can breakdown the 3rd down offense further by looking at the situational statistics for passing and rushing. Cal opted to pass the ball 65.9% of the time on 3rd downs. When we look at the per-distance breakdown for the offense :

Situation	G	Att	Comp	Pct.	Yards	TD	Int	Rating	Long	1st	1st Down Conversion Rate	15+	25+
3rd Down	13	118	72	61	888	9	2	146.01	63	52	44.07%	20	4
3rd Down, 1-3 To Go	12	30	19	63.3	138	3	0	134.97	21	12	40.00%	3	0
3rd Down, 4-6 To Go	12	32	19	59.4	212	2	1	129.41	24	15	46.88%	5	0
3rd Down, 7-9 To Go	9	27	15	55.6	233	3	1	157.31	63	12	44.44%	4	2
3rd Down, 10+ To Go	12	29	19	65.5	305	1	0	165.24	44	13	44.83%	8	2

Sonny Dykes and Tony Franklin time and time again trusted Jared Goff to produce on 3rd downs. (For Comparison's sake, Jared Goff and co.'s 3rd down conversion rate via the air is equal to Kirk Cousin's and Andy Dalton's 2015 stats and would be good for #7 in the NFL). We can see that the passing offense was efficient at moving the sticks regardless of the distance on 3rd.

Rushing on 3rd Down

Situation	G	Att	Yards	Avg.	TD	Long	1st	1st Down Conversion Rate	10+	20+
3rd Down	13	61	206	3.38	0	42	27	44.26%	9	3
3rd Down, 1-3 To Go	10	32	52	1.63	0	21	17	53.13%	2	1
3rd Down, 4-6 To Go	8	10	55	5.5	0	12	5	50.00%	2	0
3rd Down, 7-9 To Go	6	8	14	1.75	0	12	2	25.00%	1	0
3rd Down, 10+ To Go	9	11	85	7.73	0	42	3	27.27%	4	2

3rd downs aren't optimal rushing downs. More often than not the ball will fly through the air than not. When Cal did run the ball it wasn't great across the board. On 3rd and 1-3 to go, the expectation is that the o-line generates enough power for the RB to make a push down the field, and even with Big Bad Vic and his  235 pounds, we only gained the first down on 53.13% of times (#9 in the Pac-12, Stanfurd was #1 with 65.4%).

Defense

	Name	Games	Attempts	Conversions	Conversion %
1	USC	14	188	68	36.17
2	Stanford	14	193	70	36.27
3	Washington	13	204	75	36.76
4	Arizona State	13	211	81	38.39
5	Utah	13	193	76	39.38
6	UCLA	13	217	86	39.63
7	Oregon	13	199	84	42.21
8	Colorado	13	206	87	42.23
9	California	13	193	83	43.01
10	Washington State	13	191	85	44.5
11	Oregon State	12	167	76	45.51
12	Arizona	13	209	96	45.93

This isn't pretty. Cal's defense was one of the worst in the conference and it wasn't even close to the top echelon defenses in the conference with 7 percentage point difference (which translates to 13.5 extra conversions for opposing offenses, and about 1 extra conversion per-game).

When we look into the per-game performance, we can see that there is a lot of variance in the amount of 3rd downs the defense allowed last year. It does not bode well for Cal that WSU's Luke Falk (because Wazzu doesn't like to run the ball) had a field day against our defense converting 9 out of 15 3rd downs. Furthermore, despite the effort of the defense to keep Utah's offense down we still lost.

Passing Defense on 3rd Down

Situation	G	Att	Comp	Pct.	Yards	TD	Int	Rating	Long	1st	1st Down Conversion Rate	15+	25+
3rd Down	13	107	56	52.3	774	5	7	115.45	54	40	37.38%	16	6
3rd Down, 1-3 To Go	9	12	6	50	51	1	1	96.53	12	5	41.67%	0	0
3rd Down, 4-6 To Go	11	29	16	55.2	125	2	2	100.34	14	11	37.93%	0	0
3rd Down, 7-9 To Go	12	32	21	65.6	340	2	2	163.01	54	16	50.00%	8	3
3rd Down, 10+ To Go	11	34	13	38.2	258	0	2	90.22	46	8	23.53%	8	3

The most worrying line on this table is the 3rd down with 7-9 to go. For a team to convert at this range though the air is inexcusable. In this range it boils down into an obvious passing situation where the defense can key into the pass and yet, in our case, the defense fails to stop the conversion half of the time. Cal was dead last in this category in the Pac-12 alongside WSU, UCLA lead the conference with 28.21%.

And if you think that these numbers are bad. Don't wait for it.

Rushing Defense on 3rd Down

Situation	G	Att	Yards	Avg.	TD	Long	1st	1st Down Conversion Rate	10+	20+
3rd Down	13	86	343	3.99	3	45	37	43.02%	13	3
3rd Down, 1-3 To Go	11	41	155	3.78	1	30	26	63.41%	4	2
3rd Down, 4-6 To Go	7	17	105	6.18	1	45	9	52.94%	5	1
3rd Down, 7-9 To Go	7	9	26	2.89	0	8	1	11.11%	0	0
3rd Down, 10+ To Go	11	19	57	3	1	15	1	5.26%	4	0

We aren't good at stopping power runs by opponents. This means that our D-line was routinely manhandled by opposing O-lines for first downs. With the lack of size on the line for 2016 this line will remain a concern. If the stat-line for Cal will remain the same as for 2015, I hope we can force opponents to 3rd and long because at any other level it will be tragedy and lots of complaints from yours truly. With the decrease in the amount of talent and bodies in the LB position adds another layer of concern for the defense.

LBs are essential in both run defense and defending the short passing game. Yet, with the transfers for Barton and Nickerson we are losing institutional knowledge that would've helped in play recognition, and performing defensive audibles.

Concluding Thoughts

3rd down is the money down since these downs make or break drives and games. In 2015 many of the 3rd downs were gained through the air and we cannot depend on them in 2016 due to the departure of Jared Goff and co. Furthermore, the rushing offense on 3rd and short needs to improve dramatically.

I am more worried with the 3rd down defense. The infusion of DB talent should amend the high conversion rates on 3rd downs. However, even with the increased level of talent on the DB side, it is hard to cover-up a lack luster D-line that fails to apply pressure on the QB on obvious passing situations or that fails to stop power runs on 3rd and short. It will be a tough season for Cal on 3rd down, with uncertainty when we have the ball and gloomy sign when we do not have the ball.

CLASS DISMISSED.